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FAME LAW:
REQUIRING PROOF OF NATIONAL FAME IN
TRADEMARK LAW
Xuan-Thao Nguyen*

ABSTRACT

The public has always been infatuated with fame. Trademark law
likewise has a long history of infatuation with fame. Protecting thefame
embodied in a trademark against dilutive use by others has not been
easy. The difficulty stems from the wording of the statute and judicial
failure to understand the 'fame" requirement. The fundamental question centers on what level offame is requiredfor the property-likeprotection against subsequent uses that dilute the famous trademark. This
Article argues for national fame to be the requisite requirement for
property-like anti-dilutionprotection under trademark law. The Article
recommends that the proof of nationalfame should be survey evidence
showing at least seventy percent of the generalconsuming public across
the United States recognizing the trademark. Bestowing trademarks
property-like protection to those with proof of nationalfame strikes a
reasonable balance between the interests of trademark owners and the
public.
INTRODUCTION

Is NYC Triathlon' a name with fame status entitling it to special
protection under trademark law? How many consumers in the United
States recognize the AMERICA'S TEAM 2 or 5-HOUR ENERGY 3
* Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; Former IP Associate, Fried Frank Harris
Shriver & Jacobson (NYC) and Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn (NYC). This Article was made
possible by the John P. Hall Endowed Faculty Research Fund. Many thanks to my valuable
research assistants Pei-Chih "Peggy" Ho, Elizabeth Polk, and Michelle Tran, SMU Dedman
School of Law Class of 2011. As always, special thanks to Erik Darwin Hille and Khai-Leif
Nguyen-Hille for their love, patience, and support.
I See N.Y.C. Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2 See Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. America's Team Props., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d
622 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
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trademarks? Has CHEM-DRY 4 achieved the requisite level of fame for
broad protection? Where is KU or KANSAS UNIVERSITY 5 in the
spectrum of fame? Have these trademarks attained enough fame to be
deemed sufficiently famous for broad nationwide protection? How
many people in the general consuming public actually recognize any of
these trademarks? 6
Fame is defined as "the condition of being known or talked about
by many people, [especially] on account of notable achievement." 7 The
public has always been infatuated with fame, as images of and headlines
about famous movie stars, super models, athletes, politicians, and celebrity chefs appear in online and offline media at any given time.8 The
public knows well that fame is not eternal. 9 Fame fades with time and
requires much effort to forestall it from fading. 10 Trademarks with fame
share the same problems as celebrities, as many once well-known
trademarks have either declined or disappeared from the public view.11
3 See Innovation Ventures LLC v. Hoodiamax USA, No. CV 09-5426 AHM, 2010 WL
3171318 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9,2010).
4 See Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164-65 (D. Utah 2007).
5 See Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2008).
6 For example, the trademark LEXIS is widely recognized by lawyers and law students as
one of the main legal databases, but the mark is hardly recognized by the general consuming
public. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir.
1989) (noting that although seventy-six percent of attorneys recognized the trademark LEXIS for
computer-assisted legal research service, only one percent of the general population make the
correct association, and half of this one percent were attorneys or accountants).
7 THE OXFORD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 2007).
8 Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A HistoricalPerspective, 22

YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 193-94 (2010) (tracing the history of modem embrace of fame and
noting that by "1927, the celebrity pantheon, as reflected in the content of a typical issue of the
Sunday New York Times, included Broadway producers, literary figures, movie stars, society
personalities, sports players, the owners of baseball teams, screenwriters, and chefs, among
others"); Justin Pats, The Show Must Go On: An EgalitarianApproach to Descendibility as
Applied to a ProspectiveFederalPersonaRight Statutes, 35 N. KY. L. REv. 37, 51 (2008) (noting

that celebrities with high earning power are individuals "who are often catapulted to fame, and
notoriety, not by their own accomplishments, but rather by the public's oft-unpredictable
adoration and infatuation for them").
9 The obsession with achieving eternal fame can be seen in the Hippocratic Oath. See Lisa R.
Hasday, The HippocraticOath as Literary Text: A Dialogue Between Law and Medicine, 2 YALE
J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 299, 304 (2002) (noting that the "[o]ath's closing words seem to

indicate that the Hippocratic physician is more concerned about whether he will enjoy eternal
fame than whether his patients will live life to the fullest").
10 See Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Fame
often is fortuitous and fleeting. It always depends on the participation of the public in the creation
of an image. It usually depends on the communication of information about the famous person by
the media."); see also John Bronsteen et al., Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1625

(2010) (stating that fame "and recognition have fleeting hedonic consequences"); Sheldon W.
Halpern, The Right ofPublicity: CommercialExploitation ofthe Associative Value ofPersonality,

39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1224 (1986) (noting that courts in addressing fame are moved "by the
ephemeral nature of fame").
I1 See generally Robert Brauneis & Paul Heald, Trademark Infringement, Trademark
Dilution, and the Decline in Sharing of Famous Brand Names: An Introduction and Empirical
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Similarly, trademark law has a long history of infatuation with
fame. 12 The idea of protecting famous trademarks has been in existence
for many years.13 Internationally, the concept of protection for wellknown' 4 trademarks is evident in the old and influential Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.' 5 In the United States, the

Study, 59 BUFF. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (investigating the decline of famous trademarks
among business and positing a host of non-legal factors contributing to the decline); Doris Estelle
Long, Is Fame All There Is? Beating Global Monopolists at Their Own Marketing Game, 40

GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 123, 142 (2008) (observing that "a mark that is famous today may not
be famous tomorrow [and that] [s]uch fleeting fame is even more likely with the global internet,
where fads can rise quickly and just as quickly disappear").
12 Alexis Weissberger, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An International
Perspective on the Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS &

ENT. L.J. 739, 740 (2006) (noting the international struggle in addressing fame for the crossborder protection of well-known trademarks).
13 Blake W. Jackson, Notorious: The Treatment ofFamous Trademarks in America and How
Protection Can Be Ensured, 3 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 61, 65 (2009) (discussing the

U.S. and international attempts to protect famous foreign trademarks).
14 Madrid Protocol Implementation Act and Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995:
Hearingon H.R. 1270 and H.R. 1295 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of

the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Philip G. Hampton II, Assistant
Comm'r for Trademarks), available at 1995 WL 435751, at *3 (F.D.C.H. 1995) ("The United
States is obligated to protect famous marks pursuant to Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention . . . ."). Article 6bis, however, refers to "well-known" marks and the Paris
Convention does not afford anti-dilution protection for such marks. See David S. Welkowitz,
Famous Marks Under TDRA, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 983, 986 n.14 (2009).

15 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, May 4, 1970, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at 1970 WL 104436. The provision for protection of
famous trademark is Article 6bis of the 1925 version of the Paris Convention:
Marks: Well-Known Marks
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits,
or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and
to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation,
or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as
being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and
used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the
essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark
or an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be allowed for
requesting the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of the Union may
provide for a period within which the prohibition of use must be requested.
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the prohibition
of the use of marks registered or used in bad faith.
The current International Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) incorporates the Paris Article 6bis into TRIPS Article 16.3:
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or
services which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered,
provided that use of that trademark in relation to those goods or services would
indicate a connection between those goods or services and the owner of the registered
trademark and provided that the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are
likely to be damaged by such use.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, availableat http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/27-trips.pdf.
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desire to protect famous trademarks within domestic boundaries against
dilutive use' 6 can be traced back to 1988,17 though courts had recognized earlier that some trademarks possessed a high level of recognition
among consumers and thus should be entitled to broader protection.' 8
The protection enables the owner of a famous trademark to enjoin others from using the mark on noncompeting goods and services. For example, using the KODAK trademark for cameras may prevent its use on
bicycles, as using the ROLLS-ROYCE name for automobiles may prohibit its use on pens or tubes.' 9
Protecting the fame embodied in a trademark against dilutive use
by others has an uneasy and torturous history in trademark dilution
law. 20 The history spans from the 1927 law review article penned by
16 The current definition for dilutive use is in the Federal Trademark Revision Act of 2006:
"Dilution by blurring" is defined as an "association arising from the similarity between a mark or
trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark" and "dilution
by tarnishment" means an "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name
and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) &
(C) (2006).
17 Welkowitz, supra note 14, at 985 (stating that "[flame enters the picture in 1987, when the
United States Trademark Association (as the International Trademark Association was then
called) included a provision for federal dilution protection of famous (registered) marks as part of
its proposal to amend the Lanham Act").
18 See, e.g., Dan Robbins & Assocs. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 1009, 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
("A mark's fame can influence its breadth of protection."); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Tile Corp.,
345 F.2d 214, 215 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (reversing the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's decision
upon recognizing that the trademark TIFFANY is a well-known trademark and permitting Tiffany
& Co. to oppose the registration of the trademark TIFFANY'S TILE for ceramic tiles); see also
Telemed Corp. v. Tel-Med, Inc., 588 F.2d 213, 219 (7th Cir. 1978) ("A mark that is strong
because of its fame or its uniqueness is more likely to be associated in the public mind with a
greater breadth of products or services than is a mark that is weak because it is very much like
similar marks."); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 572 F.2d 574, 577 (7th Cir.
1978) ("When a particular mark is famous, . . . as is true in the case of Beefeater Gin, it is error to
limit the effect of the mark to a competing liquor product, or even to a restaurant which sells
liquor.").
19 Courts have long pondered the question of "whether the use of a famous brand on a
noncompeting product constitutes an actionable infringement." See Phila. Storage Battery Co. v.
Mindlin, 296 N.Y.S. 176, 178 (Sup. Ct. 1937). The Mindlin court noted that the protection for
famous marks had been broader:
The ambit of protection is constantly being widened. The adoption of 'Kodak' for
cameras precludes its use on bicycles; 'Rolls-Royce,' the name of an automobile, may
not be appropriated for radio tubes; 'Times' as a brand for bicycles may be restrained
by the proprietor of a newspaper bearing that name; 'Waterman' as a mark for razor
blades may be interdicted at the suit of the fountain pen company; the use of 'Dunhill,'
the famous brand for smokers' supplies, on shirts constitutes an infringement; the same
mark may not be used on liniment and soap; automobiles and tires; food products and
oleomargarine; upon electrical appliances and spark plugs; upon cooking utensils and
wash boilers; or upon mineral oil and figs.
Id. at 180 (internal citations omitted).
20 Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH.

L.J. 1227, 1231 n.10 (2008) (noting that Massachusetts became the first state to extend antidilution protection to trademarks in 1947 and that the United States did not have any federal
trademark dilution law until the first successful legislation in 1995); see also Welkowitz, supra
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Frank Schechter, 21 "the father of the dilution theory," 22 to the enactments of various state statutes with different requirements relating to
fame, 23 the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1995,24 and
finally the Supreme Court's Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. opin-

ion, 25 which led to the revamping of the federal dilution law in 2006 as
a direct response to the decision. 26
The last major overhaul in fame jurisprudence for famous trademark protection was the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Revision Act (TDRA) of 2006.27 Though many praised the passage of
the TDRA, 28 five years later courts continue to struggle with anti-

note 14, at 984-93 (providing a history of fame and anti-dilution law).
21 Frank L. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813,

824-25 (1927) (suggesting that, even with non-competing goods or services and without evidence
of likelihood of confusion, the junior user's mark may "whittle away" the distinctiveness of the
senior user's mark).
22 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1028 (2d Cir.
1989).
23 The United States Trademark Association, later renamed as the International Trademark
Association, drafted the 1964 and 1992 versions of the Model State Trademark Bill for protection
of famous trademarks against dilution. Mark H. Anania, Note, The Plight of Small Business
TrademarkHolders, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 565, 588-90 (2007). Fourteen states adopted the 1964
Model Bill, which does not require "fame" for the trademark seeking anti-dilution protection. Id.
at 588 (noting that the fourteen states include Alabama, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and Texas). Twenty-three states adopted the 1992 Model Bill, which requires that the trademark
must be famous. Id. at 589 (listing the twenty-three states of Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming).
24 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996),
amended by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (originally enacted as
Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 43, 60 Stat. 427 (1946)).
25 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that the FTDA
requires proof of actual dilution, not likelihood of dilution).
26 See Blake R. Bertagna, PoachingProfits: An Examination of the Ability of a Trademark
Owner to Recover an Infringer'sProfits Under the Lanham Act as Amended in 1999, 16 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 257, 265-66 (2008) (recounting the development of the federal dilution law);
Matthew J. Slowik, Ahead of the Curve? The Effect of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of

2006 on the Federal Circuit, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 349, 349 (2009) (explaining how the TDRA was
the legislative response to the Supreme Court's ruling on proof of dilution of famous trademarks).
27 Some commentators have provided assessment of the TDRA after the first year of its
enactment. See Barton Beebe, The ContinuingDebacle of US. Antidilution Law: Evidence from
the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &

HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 450 (2008) (concluding that after the first year of the new law, "antidilution
law continues to have no appreciable effect on the outcomes of federal trademark cases or the
remedies issuing from those outcomes"); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1031
(2006) (noting that, as of 2006, federal judicial enforcement of dilution law was rather weak).
28 See Scot A. Duvall, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: BalancedProtectionfor
Famous Brands, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1252, 1255 (2007) (asserting that the TDRA "balances the

legitimate concerns of owners of famous brands and newcomers to the marketplace" and "brings
much-needed balance and clarity to the Lanham Act's treatment of this oft-maligned area of the
law").
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dilution law protection for famous trademarks, 29 as seen in the decisions
where courts erroneously held that NYC TRIATHLON, AMERICA'S
TEAM, 5-HOUR ENERGY, and CHEM-DRY, among other marks, are
famous for the broad protection under TDRA. 30 Judicial struggle with
the "fame" requirement is due to a host of factors. 31 The difficulty stems
from the wording of the statute and judicial failure to grasp legislative
history and intent in interpreting the statute with respect to "fame." 32
The fundamental question centers on what level of fame is required
for protection against subsequent uses that dilute the distinctiveness of
the famous trademark? 33 In other words, how much "fame" is deemed
sufficient to satisfy "famousness" under current U.S. trademark antidilution law? 34
This Article argues that national fame as recognized by at least
seventy percent of the U.S. general consuming public must be the requirement for protection under the TDRA. The heightened level of fame
requirement functions as a gatekeeper to prevent widespread of treating
trademarks purely as property in trademark jurisprudence. It is consistent with congressional intent for the few deserving trademarks with
broad property protection and with the language of the statute that states
the mark must be widely known by the general consuming public.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will trace the fascination with fame in trademark law and the rise and fall of the "big fish in a
small pond" theory to protect trademarks known in niches. Part II will
discuss the TDRA in which fame is defined for anti-dilution protection.
Five years after the passage of the new law, courts are still struggling
with what fame is. Part III will identify and discuss the erroneous decisions on fame rendered by courts. Part IV will provide possible explanations for judicial shortcomings and a solution that would rectify the
situation and is consistent with congressional intent under the statute.
The Article suggests that survey evidence showing at least seventy percent of the general consuming public across the United States recognizes a trademark is necessary to establish national fame for propertylike protection of the famous trademark. The Article concludes that
bestowing trademarks property-like protection to those with proof of

29 See infra Part III.
30 See infra Part III.
31 See infra Part IV.

32 See cases cited and discussion infra Parts III, IV.
33 Welkowitz, supra note 14, at 993-96 (addressing the reasons why fame is required for antidilution protection).
34 Internationally, the fame question is a struggle for nations to address under the famous or
well-known trademark doctrine. Jackson, supra note 13, at 65 (stating that the problem of
protecting foreign famous trademark is compounded by not having a test to measure fame and
that "[w]ithout a good test of determining which trademarks are famous, and therefore deserving
of protection, the famous trademarks doctrine struggles").
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national fame strikes a reasonable balance between the interests of
trademark owners and the public.
I.

THE DEATH OF THE "BIG FISH IN A SMALL POND" FAME LAW

The fascination with fame in trademark law lays the foundation for
courts to formulate the much-maligned "big fish in a small pond" theory
to protect certain trademarks. 35 Under the theory, a name is deemed to
have sufficient fame to award it "famous" status if it is recognized in a
particular industry or geographical area. 36 The owner of the "famous"
name has the right to exclude others from using the name on unrelated
products or services. 37 The owner can enjoy the right to exclude even
without proof of likelihood of consumer confusion caused by use of the
famous name by others on noncompeting goods. 38
Embracing the "big fish in a small pond" theory, many courts expanded the rights of holders of trademarks that are not household
names. For example, the Third Circuit in Times MirrorMagazines, Inc.
v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L. C. held that the trademark THE SPORT35 See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 17374 (3d Cir. 2000) (Barry, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority in this case for its approval of the
'big fish in a small pond' theory of trademark dilution, which may "overrun" existing trademark
infringement law and injure legitimate competition in the marketplace). See also the criticism
offered by Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J.

111, 133 (1998):
Courts approving the "big fish in a small pond" theory of trademark dilution fail to
recognize that it threatens to overrun trademark infringement law. Trademark
infringement law permits similar, or even identical, marks to coexist on non-competing
goods. If even a locally famous mark can preclude all other marks in every channel of
trade, then conceivably every trademark can be used to create a monopoly in a word or
symbol-a proposition clearly contrary to the intent and practice of trademark law. It is
possible to find virtually any mark to be "famous" within some market, depending on
how narrowly that market is defined.
36 See Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377 (Or. 1983) (en banc) (protecting a local
trademark known only in the eastern part of one county in Oregon).
37 For example, applying the "big fish in a small pond theory," the Oregon Supreme Court in
Wedgwood Homes held that the owner of a local trademark is entitled to protection under dilution
law against the use of that mark on unrelated goods. Id. The Court could "see no reason why
marks of national renown should enjoy protection while local marks should not. A small local
firm may expend efforts and money proportionately as great as those of a large firm in order to
establish its mark's distinct quality. In both situations the interest to be protected and the damage
to be prevented are the same." Id. at 381.
38 Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
("[T]he federal courts seem ready at this point to protect a senior user of a suggestive mark from
potentially serious harm caused by dilution, where the alleged infringer's use is in connection
with noncompeting goods that are related to the senior user's goods."). But see, e.g., Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445, 450 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejecting Holiday Inns's
dilution argument that even where "there is no likelihood of confusion of the products or
source[], ... the use of the trademark by the subsequent user will lessen the uniqueness of the
prior user's mark with the possible future result that a strong mark may become a weak mark").
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ING NEWS was famous in the sports periodicals arena in Las Vegas.3 9
Similarly, in Binney & Smith v. Rose Art Industries, the district court

found that the color scheme of Crayola has achieved sufficient fame to
be deemed famous, citing hundreds of millions of advertisement expenditures in the last forty years. 40 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit extended the niche fame of trademarks to trade dress-the look and feel or
packaging of a product or service. 4 1 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit in
Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire PaperCorp. held that the trade dress

of plastic baskets used for floral bouquets at funerals was famous in its
niche market in which the defendant had adopted a similar trade dress. 42
Consequently, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, in
restating famous trademark law, proclaimed that "[a] mark that is highly
distinctive only to a select class or group of purchasers may be protected from diluting uses directed at that particular class or group." 43
Reinforcing the niche fame doctrine, the Fifth Circuit in Advantage
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co. held that the owner of a

trademark needs only to prove that the trademark is famous within the
car rental market, not in the broader market. 44 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton recognized fame in a localized

trading market or a specialized market segment for the purpose of protecting famous trademarks under dilution law. 4 5
The above cases and other similar cases decided by district and circuit courts across the nation 46 raised some concerns. The cases were not
39 See Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 169 (holding that the district court did not err by

finding that the SPORTING NEWS trademark is famous in its sports news market in Las Vegas,
and is therefore entitled to protection from the defendant's use of a similar trademark in the same
market), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1071 (2001).

40 See Binney & Smith v. Rose Art Indus., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 2000 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
41 See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (addressing trade
dress protection for the look and feel of a fast food restaurant); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Should It Be
a Freefor All? The Challenge of Extending Trade Dress Protection to the Look and Feel of Web
Sites in the Evolving Internet, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1233 (2000).

42 Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999)
("[N]iche-market renown is a factor indicating fame [in] a context like the one here, in which the
plaintiff and defendant are using the mark in the same or related markets.").
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. e (1995).

44 Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co., 238 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir.
2001) ("Enterprise needed only to show that its 'We'll Pick You Up' mark is famous within the
car rental industry, not in a broader market.").
45 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"fame in a localized trading area may meet" the fame requirement of the dilution statute as may
fame in a specialized market segment when the "diluting uses are directed narrowly at the same
market segment").
46 See Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002); Advantage RentA-Car, 238 F.3d at 381; Rhee Bros. v. Han Ah Reum Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D. Md. 2001);
NBBJ E. Ltd. P'ship v. NBBJ Training Acad., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 800 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Simon
Prop. Grp. v. mySimon, Inc., No. IP 99-1195-C-H/S, 2000 WL 1206575 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2000);
Michael Caruso & Co. v. Estefan Enters., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff'd, 166
F.3d 353 (1lth Cir. 1998); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp. 568,
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about unfair competition behavior engaged by the defendants or the
confusion suffered by the consumer and the harmed incurred by owners
of the trademarks. 47 The courts, by extending protection for fame, treated fame embodied in a trademark as property in gross. 4 8 These concerns
led some courts to limit niche fame protection to only when the defendant used a similar mark within the same niche. 49 For example, the
Ninth Circuit in Thane International,Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp. found

that TREK is known among bicycle enthusiasts but not stationaryexercise machine users, and therefore TREK's fame does not qualify for
the famousness requirement for protection beyond the niche market
under the then trademark dilution law.5 0
Other courts expressed their skepticism toward the expanding
rights bestowed on marks that have "brief fame" in a small niche market
or a "small segment of the population."51 They questioned whether such
marks should possess the enormous power to prohibit all other uses in
all industries throughout the country. 52 They, not surprisingly, rejected
the niche fame and required that fame must be established nationwide in
578 (D. Colo. 1997), aff'd, 185 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1999); Golden Bear Int'l, Inc. v. Bear
U.S.A., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996); cf Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989).
47 See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Dilution in Japan, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228,

228 (2006) ("Trademark dilution is a right awarded to famous trademark holders to prevent the
use of the same or similar marks on non-competing goods or services."); Steven Wilf, The
Making of the Post-War Paradigmin American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. &

ARTS 139, 171 (2008) ("Dilution doctrine represented a shift from a tort model to a proprietary
model of trademark. Trademarks had been transformed into a distinct form of property with
uncanny psychological power.").
48 See Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 875 (stating that under trademark dilution law, the
protection for famous trademarks "tread[s] very close to granting 'rights in gross' in a
trademark," thereby hampering competition and the marketing of new products).
49 Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 164 (3d
Cir. 2000) ("We are persuaded that a mark not famous to the general public is nevertheless
entitled to protection from dilution where both the plaintiff and defendant are operating in the
same or related markets, so long as the plaintiffs mark possesses a high degree of fame in its
niche market."); Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 877-78 (explaining that the statute protects a
mark only when a mark is famous within a niche market and the alleged diluter uses the mark
within that niche).
50 Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 910 ("[T]he evidence is more than sufficient to allow a trier of fact
to find that TREK is a famous mark within the narrow market segment devoted to non-stationary
bicycle production and sales. But there is no reason to expect that the typical purchaser of
stationary exercise machines-particularly those who buy their exercise machines as a result of
seeing television infomercials-buys bicycles or bicycle-related products, reads bicycle
magazines or watches bicycle competitions on television, any more than anybody else does. That
the mark 'TREK' is famous with bicycle enthusiasts is therefore of little pertinence in gauging
the fame of the mark in the market segment occupied by Thane, the junior user.").
51 TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that
anti-dilution at the federal level is not "intended to confer on marks that have enjoyed only brief
fame in a small part of the country, or among a small segment of the population").
52 Id. ("It seems most unlikely that Congress intended to confer on marks that have enjoyed
only brief fame in a small part of the country, or among a small segment of the population, the
power to enjoin all other users throughout the nation in all realms of commerce.").
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order for a name or trademark to be deemed famous.5 3 Some courts
articulated that only marks that have achieved "fame among the general
consuming public," 54 a "substantial degree of fame,"55 or are approaching the high degree of fame enjoyed by "household" names such as
"Dupont, Buick, or Kodak" 56 are qualified for broad, expansive national
protection against free-riders and diluters of the famous trademarks.57
In summary, the development of jurisprudence on fame, as illustrated above, reveals an uneasy history of determining the appropriate
level of fame for an actionable claim against trademark diluters. Prior to
2006, Congress did not include a definition of fame for judicial determination of whether a trademark qualifies as famous for anti-dilution
purposes. 58 Congress left the task to the courts to fashion fame on their
own. Courts narrowly construed niche fame against diluters of fame and
limited the protection in cases where the diluters were using similar
famous names in the very same niche. Over time, judicial recognition of
broad protection for niche fame diminished as some courts have insisted
that very few deserving trademarks can be deemed truly famous and are
qualified for the expansive, national right against all diluters in all industries, markets, and geographical regions. 59
The last nail in the coffin for the "big fish in a small pond" theory
for the protection of fame came in late 2006, when Congress passed the
TDRA. The TDRA eliminated niche fame and imposed a substantially
higher degree of fame that a trademark must possess for the purpose of
dilution law. 60 The theory, however, is not completely dead, as courts
53 See generally id. See also Heidi Ott A.G. v. Target Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Minn.
2001); Michael Caruso & Co. v. Estefan Enters., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Avery
Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 875 ("[T]o meet the 'famousness' element of protection under the
dilution statutes "'a mark [must] be truly prominent and renowned."' (quoting I.P. Lund Trading
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998)).
54 Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 911.

55 TCPIP Holding Co., 244 F.3d at 99; Friesland Brands, B.V. v. Viet. Nat. Milk Co., 228 F.
Supp. 2d 399, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Congress envisioned that marks would qualify as 'famous'
only if they carried a substantial degree of fame." (citations omitted)).
56 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466 n.4 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
actions are available to protect famous trademark against diluters for using "DuPont shoes, Buick
aspirin,... and Kodak pianos"); Friesland Brands, B.V., 228 F. Supp. 2d at 412 (noting that
examples of famous marks given in legislative reports were household words like "Buick" or
"Kodak").
57 Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 911.

58 Componentone, L.L.C. v. Componentart, Inc., No. 02:05cvl122, 2007 WL 4302108, at *1
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2007) ("Prior to the amendment, the statute contained no language defining
fame so specifically or narrowly.").
59 See, e.g., Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 911; TCPIP Holding, 244 F.3d at 99; IP. Lund Trading,

163 F.3d at 46.
60 See Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP v. Milbank Holding Corp., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d
1583, 1588 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (stating that the TDRA precludes a finding of niche market fame);
Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 307 n.90 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(stating that the inclusion of the phrase "widely recognized by the general consuming public in
the United States" in the TDRA rejected dilution claims based on niche market factors).
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continue to misread the revised statute and bestow famous status on
trademarks known only in niche markets. 61
II.
A.

PROTECTING FAME BEYOND THE NICHE

Fame-Widely Recognized by the GeneralConsuming Public

On October 6, 2006, Congress revamped the law on fame by
amending the trademark anti-dilution statute. Under the TDRA, the
level of fame required is a much higher burden for a trademark holder to
prove. 62 The holder must establish that its trademark is "widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States." 63 Trademarks with a level of fame recognized by the public only in a specialized segment or geographic place or region in the United States are not
protected. 64
Also, by limiting the general consuming public to the United
States, the TDRA adheres to the territoriality of trademark law. 65 The
61 See infra Part IV.

62 The TDRA prescribes that:
(c) Dilution by blurring; dilution by tarnishment
(1) Injunctive relief
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled
to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner's
mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by
tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of
actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.
(2) Definitions
(A) For purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if it is widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner. In
determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition,
the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or
third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or
services offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
63 Id. (providing the definition of "famous" mark).
64 See Roederer v. J. Garcia Carri6n, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 879 (D. Minn. 2010) ("A
mark that is famous only within a niche market does not qualify as 'famous' within the meaning
of [the TDRA's] § 1125(c).").
65 Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir.
1985) (explaining that trademark territoriality is "basic to trademark law," in large part because
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fame of a trademark is confined within its national territory. 66 That

means evidence demonstrating that a particular mark is widely recognized by the general consuming public in other countries is not considered part of or a substitution for fame recognition by the U.S. general
consuming public. 67
In determining whether a mark has achieved fame or "possesses
the requisite degree of recognition," the TDRA permits courts to consider "all relevant factors, including" four specific factors identified in
the statute: (i) the duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising
and publicity of the trademark; (ii) the amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (iii) the
extent of actual recognition of the mark; and (iv) whether the mark was
registered on the Principal Register with the Trademark Office. 68
The first and second factors reflect the traditional concepts of market place recognition that courts have applied for decades in evaluating
and determining fame in general. 69 The third factor, "the extent of ac"trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme"); Am.
Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1963) (stating that trademark
protection is territorial and the protection is limited to the areas in which the mark has been used).
66 Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding the Japanese trademark
"Person," though known in Japan, has no reputation in the United States, meaning the known
foreign mark has no priority in the United States); see also Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo &
Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The territoriality principle, as stated in a treatise, says
that '[piriority of trademark rights in the United States depends solely upon priority of use in the
United States, not on priority of use anywhere in the world."').
67 See generally Person's Co., 900 F.2d 1565.
68 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); see also Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 879 ("In determining
whether a mark is famous, a court may consider all relevant factors, including (1) the duration,
extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or
publicized by the owner or third parties, (2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales
of goods offered under the mark, (3) the extent of actual recognition of the mark, and (4) whether
the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on
the Principal Register.").
69 See Gen. Motors Co. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, No. 2:06-CV-00133 BSJ, 2010 WL 5395065,
at *5 (D. Utah Dec. 27, 2010) ("The company has spent hundreds of millions of dollars
advertising Hummer products in print, on television, online, at the point of sale, and at events.
Promotion of the brand has been world-wide. Many of the Hummer marks are licensed to other
companies for non-automotive products such as golf carts and toys. These licensed products
results in over $2 billion in revenue to GM annually."); Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n v. JSL Corp., 590
F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1315 (D. Nev. 2008) ("[In applying the first factor of the TDRA, the court
finds that the plaintiff] has widely promoted and advertised the VISA mark for more than twentyfive years in print, on the internet, and in other media. During the four-year period from 1997
through 2000, Plaintiff spent more than $1 billion on advertising in the United States. With regard
to geographical reach, the VISA mark has been used in each of the fifty states, in more than 300
countries and territories, and on the internet. Given this evidence, the court concludes that this
factor weighs strongly in favor of a finding that VISA is a famous mark." (citations omitted)).
With respect to the second factor, the court in General Motors Co. found that the plaintiff showed
that its sales were two billion dollars in annual revenue. 2010 WL 5395065, at *5.
Prior to the passage of the TDRA, the court in AM General Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp. considered whether a group of marks owned by Daimler-Chrysler were famous as follows:
In deciding whether DaimlerChrysler's family of marks is "famous" within the
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tual recognition of the mark," is meant to incorporate survey evidence,
market research such as brand-awareness studies, unsolicited media
coverage, as well as other evidence of consumer recognition of the
mark. 70 The last factor is registration of the trademark. This factor does
not have any probative value in evaluating fame, as the mere existence
of a registration really is not relevant to whether a trademark is famous. 7 ' The phrase "all relevant factors, including" suggests that the
factors are nonexclusive, and courts therefore have discretion to consider factors outside the four named factors.72
Upon establishing the requisite fame, the trademark owner will
then proceed to the next step of proving dilution under either the blurring theory73 or tarnishment theory. 74 Conversely, without the requisite
fame, the trademark holder fails to attain the anti-dilution protection
claim for its mark. If the trademark owner prevails on both fame identity and one of the dilution theories, remedies such as injunction and
damages may be available. 75
meaning of the statute, the court is to consider the family's inherent distinctiveness or
secondary meaning, the time and extent of DaimlerChrysler's use of the family in
connection with motor vehicles, the duration and extent of DaimlerChrysler's
advertising and publicity of the family, the size of the trading area in which
DaimlerChrysler uses the family of marks, the channels of trade for motor vehicles, the
degree of recognition of the family in those trading areas and channels of trade,
whether and how others use similar marks, and whether the family is registered.
311 F.3d 796, 804 (7th Cir. 2002).
70 See Gen. Motors, 2010 WL 5395065, at *5 (finding that plaintiff General Motors met the
third factor of the TDRA) ("[T]he survey results suggest high levels of actual recognition of the
Hummer marks. Over 71% of participants were able to produce the names GM or Hummer when
shown an image of a boxy, military-style vehicle. Thus, consumers know these marks by look and
name.").

71 Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 880 (finding that the mark in question for anti-dilution
protection was registered and noting that "one cannot logically infer fame from the fact that a
mark is one of the millions on the federal Register" (citation omitted)).
72 See Visa Int'l Serv. Ass',

590 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (noting the "fame" factors are

"nonexclusive").
73 See 15 U.S.C. § 1l25(c)(2)(B) (2006) (defining "dilution by blurring" as "association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark"). In determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to
cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially
exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with
the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.
Id.

74 See id. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (defining "dilution by tarnishment" as "association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the
famous mark").
75 The remedies available under the statute include injunctive relief under § 1116 and
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Old Fame versus New Fame

The new fame factors in the TDRA, hailed as "more narrowly focused" on identifying famous trademarks, 76 replace the longer list of
nonexclusive factors in the old statute. Under the old statute, the factors
for proving fame are as follows:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the

additional remedies such as profits, damages, and costs and attorney fees under § 1117(a), if the
violation is willful. See id. § 1125(c)(1), (5). Additional remedies are provided in relevant
paragraphs:
In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be
entitled to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title. The owner of the
famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and
1118 of this title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity if(A) the mark or trade name that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution
by tarnishment was first used in commerce by the person against whom the
injunction is sought after October 6, 2006; and
(B) in a claim arising under this subsection(i) by reason of dilution by blurring, the person against whom the injunction is
sought willfully intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark; or
(ii) by reason of dilution by tarnishment, the person against whom the injunction
is sought willfully intended to harm the reputation of the famous mark.
Id. § 1125(c)(5).
Remedies set forth in § 1117 include:
(a)Profits; damages and costs; attorney fees
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office, a violation under section t125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful
violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been established in any civil
action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions
of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of equity, to
recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the
costs of the action. The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same
to be assessed under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to
prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction
claimed. In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not
exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the
recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its
discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to
the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall
constitute compensation and not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
Id § 1117.
76 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on HR.683 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 26
(2005) [hereinafter TDRA Hearings](statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, Int'l Trademark
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
Ass'n),
available
at
hju98924.000/hju98924_0f.htm ("H.R. 683 proposes that the existing fame factors be simplified
and replaced with non-exclusive factors that are more narrowly focused on identifying marks that
are widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States."').
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goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in [the] trading areas and
channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.7 7
Comparing the above factors of the old statute to the factors for determining fame under the TDRA, there is a noticeable difference. The
old fame factors have been simplified and combined into the new factors. A careful examination, however, reveals that in reality there is not
much difference, as many of the factors in the old statute are similar to
those of the new statute. For example, factor (C) of the old statute is
factor (i) of the new statute. Factors (B), (D), and (E) of the old statute
are condensed into factor (ii) of the new statute. Factor (F) is now replaced by the new factor (iii). Factor (H) is the new factor (iv).78
The only factor in the old statute absent in the new one is factor
(A), inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark. This factor was
excluded in response to the conflict among the federal appellate circuits
as some required famous marks to possess "inherent distinctiveness"
while others declined to impose such a requirement. 79 Excluding the
distinctiveness factor, the new statute extends anti-dilution protection to
trademarks qualified as famous, regardless of if they are inherently distinctive or have acquired a secondary meaning.80
77 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
79 H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 5 (2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-

109hrpt23/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt23.pdf ("Hearings revealed that the regional circuits interpret the
FTDA differently on such matters as what constitutes a 'famous' mark, whether marks with
'acquired distinctiveness' are protected under the statute . . . .").
80 Under the old federal dilution statute, the trademark must be inherently distinctive.

Acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning was not enough. See Malletier v. Dooney &
Bourke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("It is not enough for a trademark holder
to show that the mark has acquired secondary meaning. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the mark is inherently distinctive to prevail [under the federal dilution statute]."); see also
Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir.
2000) (stating that protection from dilution uses is available only to marks that are "highly
distinctive"); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the then federal trademark dilution statute applies "only to those marks which are both truly
distinctive and famous").

104

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1

In the end, the most important difference between the two statutes
with respect to famousness is how "famous" is defined or how "famous" a mark must be in order to be deemed as legally famous for antidilution protection. 8' The niche fame embodied in actor (F) of the old
statute, that allowed any mark famous within a given trade or locale, 82
but unknown to others outside the trade or region, has been replaced
with a new stringent standard of famousness. 83 The new statute emphasizes that a mark is famous if and only if it is "widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States." 84 This begs the question of what constitutes the "general consuming public." The House
Report accompanying H.R. 683 partially provides the answer that "the
legislation expands the threshold of 'fame' and thereby denies protection for marks that are famous only in 'niche' markets."85 That means
the consuming public in a particular trade or geographical region does
not constitute the general consuming public. The new legislation requires that the consuming public come from all different markets, sectors, and regions of the United States.
III.

STRUGGLING WITH FAME

Applying the new standard of fame under the TDRA, courts have
had difficulty in the last five years in the fame category. Some courts
ignored the new law and applied the rejected old niche fame law. Some
courts abandoned the fame inquiry and leaped directly to the next inquiry; they focused on dilution by blurring or tarnishment inquiry. Other
courts superficially engaged in the fame inquiry and rendered question81 H.R. REP. No. 109-023, at 8 ("Substantial portions of § 2 are based on the existing FTDA,
but there are conspicuous differences between the two texts.... [H.R. 683] expands the threshold
of 'fame' and thereby denies protection for marks that are famous only in 'niche' markets.").
82 Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 174 (Barry, J., dissenting) ("If marks can be
'famous' within some market, depending on how narrowly that market is defined, then the FTDA
will surely devour infringement law [and it is] hard to conceive of any consumer goods or
services that are not in a narrow market of some type.").
83 See Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 698 (W.D.
Ky. 2010) (stating that niche mark is no longer recognized under the TDRA and finding that the
plaintiff mark is not famous because the advertisement expenditure of twenty-two million dollars
and annual sales of "800,000 cases" does not indicate that the trademark is one of the nation's
largest whisky producers).
84 TDRA Hearings, supra note 76, at 18 (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, Int'l
Trademark Ass'n) ("[T]he bill provides a clear definition for what constitutes a famous mark,
namely a mark that is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States.
This language narrows and strengthens the fame requirement. Dilution protection was never
meant for the average trademark. It was intended to provide extraordinary protection for
extraordinary marks.").
85 H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 8 ("Substantial portions of § 2 are based on the existing FTDA,
but there are conspicuous differences between the two texts. ... [H.R. 683] expands the threshold
of 'fame' and thereby denies protection for marks that are famous only in 'niche' markets.").
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able conclusions on famous trademarks. The three types of cases are
described and discussed more fully below.
A.

Still Applying the Old Niche Fame
1.

Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson

The plaintiff, Pet Silk, Inc., is a wholesaler of pet grooming products in connection with the trademark PET SILK within the fifteen
years prior to the commencement of the litigation in 2007.86 In the
trademark dilution suit, the district court found the trademark PET SILK
famous under the TDRA.8 7
In that case, Pet Silk sold its products through a network of fifty
distributors, both online and in pet supply retail stores.88 The defendants
were a former distributor of Pet Silk products. Due to various businessrelated problems, the plaintiff decided to terminate its relationship with
the defendants. 89 However, after the termination the defendants continued to sell Pet Silk products, and implicitly held itself out as an authorized distributor of Pet Silk products. 90 The plaintiff brought an antidilution claim along with a likelihood of confusion claim against the
defendants. 9 1 The plaintiff asserted, without any opposition from the
defendant, that its trademark is famous in the pet supply and grooming
market. 92 The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction against the
defendant. 93
In reaching its conclusion that PET SILK is a famous trademark,
the court cited the trademark dilution law which mandates that the mark
is famous "if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of
the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of
the mark's owner." 94 Peculiarly, the court ignored the TDRA's widely
recognized by the general consuming public requirement for finding a
mark famous, and relied instead on the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
the old trademark law identifying fame within a particular market. 95
86 Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
87 Id. at 830.

88 Id. at 825-26.
89 Id. at 826.
90 Id. at 826-27.
91 Id. at 828.

92 Id. at 830 (noting that the plaintiff "testified" and that the defendant "does not contest, that
Pet Silk@ has name recognition in the pet supply and dog grooming market").
93 Id. at 834 (ordering the preliminary injunction against the defendant).
94 Id. at 830 n.8 (quoting the statutory language for finding famous trademark and the factors
for evaluating whether a mark is famous).
95 Id. at 830 ("[T]he Fifth Circuit has held that market fame is sufficient." (citing Advantage
Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co., 238 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2001))).
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Summarily, the court found that "Pet Silk@ has name recognition in the
pet supply and dog grooming market." 96 In other words, the court continued to apply the old niche fame law squarely rejected by Congress
under the TDRA. 97
2.

HarrisResearch, Inc. v. Lydon

The plaintiff, Harris Research, Inc., manufactures and distributes
carpet cleaning equipment in conjunction with the trademark CHEMDRY to customers in the United States.98 The plaintiff has a network of
4000 franchises in 2600 locations throughout the United States. 99 The
defendants offered to sell and distribute shirts and stickers containing a
"Chem-Who?" logo at an industry trade show. 00 The plaintiff brought a
trademark dilution claim, in addition to other claims, against the defen0 At the preliminary injunction proceeding, the court held in the
dant.o'
plaintiffs favor, enjoining the defendant from using the "Chem-Who?"
logo.

102

On the dilution claim, the court cited the TDRA for its new standard for fame, 0 3 and yet concluded that the CHEM-DRY trademark
possessed sufficient fame for anti-dilution protection. The court found
the CHEM-DRY mark famous because it had been registered since
1979, used in advertisements throughout the United States, and sold
through thousands of franchises.1 04 Also, to support the fame finding,
the court relied on an assisted brand-awareness study which found the
CHEM-DRY mark is only known in the carpet cleaning industry. 0 5 The
court wrongly equated the general public recognition to be "the general
public in connection with carpet cleaning services."106
96 Id. (noting the defendant did not object to the finding that the PET SILK is famous, even
though it is only known within its niche).
97 Id. at 832 ("Under the new definition of dilution, the court finds that [Pet Silk] has
presented enough evidence that it has a likelihood of success on its federal dilution claim.").
98 Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164-65 (D. Utah 2007).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1169.

103 Id. at 1165 ("[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public
of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner."
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006))).
104 Id. at 1164 (recognizing that the plaintiff and its franchisees and licensees have spent
"$22,000,000 during 2006 in advertising and promoting the Chem-Dry brand and related products
and services").
105 Id. at 1164 (noting that the aided awareness in 2001 "of the Chem-Dry brand among
current customers is 100%, with total unaided awareness of the Chem-Dry brand being the
highest in the industry").
106 Id. at 1166 ("Plaintiff has shown that the Trademark is widely recognized by the general
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Taking Famefor Granted-Leap to the Next Prong

In the cases discussed below, courts ignored the fame requirement
under the TDRA by not analyzing whether the marks in question are
famous as required by statute. They intentionally forgot that, without
the requisite fame, anti-dilution protection is simply not accorded. They
instead took fame for granted by proceeding directly to the second inquiry regarding whether the defendant's use caused a likelihood of dilution. 107
1.

Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Century Insurance Group

Century 21 Real Estate company brought a trademark infringement
and dilution action against Century Insurance Group. 08 The plaintiff
asserted that its CENTURY 21 trademark is famous, and that the defendant's CENTURY trademark caused likelihood of dilution in violation
of the federal statute.109
The court completely ignored the requirement under the TDRA
that the mark must be famous. 0 Though the court acknowledged that
the current trademark dilution law "revised" the old law, and that "protection is denied to marks that are famous in only 'niche' markets," the
court did not engage in fame analysis." Instead, the court focused exclusively on whether the defendant's CENTURY mark is likely to cause
dilution of the plaintiffs CENTURY 21 mark.1 2 The court examined
whether the two marks are similar and found that they are not substantially similar to support a finding of likelihood of dilution.113 The court
also analyzed the other factors of likelihood of dilution, and concluded
public in connection with carpet cleaning services.").
107 See, e.g., Diane Von Furstenberg Studio v. Snyder, No. 1:06cvl356(JCC), 2007
2688184 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2007) (proceeding directly to likelihood of dilution instead
finding dilution against the defendant without first discussing whether the DVR trademark
"famous").
108 Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Century Ins. Grp., No. CIV 03-0053-PHX-SMM, 2007
484555, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2007).

WL
and
was
WL

109 Id. at*14.
110 Id. at *14-15.

111 Id. at *14 ("[The TDRA] revised the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in three significant
ways: (i) a likelihood of dilution, rather than actualdilution, is now required to establish dilution;
(ii) courts may apply four factors to determine whether a mark is famous and protection is denied
to marks that are famous in only 'niche' markets; and (iii) courts may apply six factors to
determine whether a mark is likely to cause dilution by blurring.").
112 Id. at * 16-18 (analyzing the factors for dilution by blurring).
113 Id. at *15 (concluding "the differences between the C21 Marks and the Century Marks are
so significant that consumers would not be confused by their contemporaneous registration and
use").
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that no reasonable jury would find for the plaintiff.11 4 Without engaging
in fame analysis and making a finding as to whether the CENTURY 21
trademark is indeed famous as required by the TDRA, the court should
not proceed with an extensive analysis of dilution by blurring, as the
trademark is not qualified for protection under the statute.
2.

Autozone, Inc. v. Strick

The plaintiffs in Autozone, Inc. v. Strick operate numerous automobile parts retail stores under the registered trademark AUTOZONE. 115 The plaintiffs had also obtained a registration for its ZONE
trademark in 2002 for retail automotive store services.11 6 On the other
hand, the defendants, known as Oil Zone, operate two locations in Illinois for a quick oil change business.' 17 One of the two locations also
has a car wash operation that uses the mark WASH ZONE.11 s The defendants obtained a trademark registration for OIL ZONE from the
State of Illinois prior to the plaintiff using its ZONE trademark.1 19 The
plaintiff brought an action of unfair competition, trademark infringement, and trademark dilution claims against the defendants.1 20
The court ruled in the defendants' favor on their motion for summary judgment, which sought to dismiss all of the plaintiffs' claims.121
With respect to the federal dilution claim, the court noted that the
TDRA is the governing law, and that it amended the federal antidilution statute by "favoring plaintiffs" with the likelihood of dilution
standard.122 The court recognized that "the owner of a famous mark that
is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be
entitled to an injunction" under the anti-dilution statute, if the owner can
prove that the defendant's trademark was likely to cause dilution.123
The court, however, failed to address whether the plaintiffs' trademarks, AUTOZONE and ZONE, possess the heightened level of fame
required for proving dilution under the TDRA.1 24 The court ignored
114 See id. at * 16-18 (applying the six factors listed in the TDRA for dilution by blurring).
115 Autozone, Inc. v. Strick, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Ill 2006), rev'd, 543 F.3d 923 (7th
Cir. 2008).
116 Id. at 1036.
117 Id.
118 Id.

119 Id. at 1036 (stating that OIL ZONE mark was registered by the defendant with the State of
Illinois in 1996).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1045.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1044-45.

124 Id. at 1045 (stating that under TDRA, plaintiffs only "bear the burden of showing at least a
likelihood of dilution").
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whether the AUTOZONE and ZONE trademarks are recognized by the
general consuming public in order to qualify for the anti-dilution protection.12 5 The court instead focused on the likelihood of dilution prong
and dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs failed to submit evidence
demonstrating the defendants' OIL ZONE and WASH ZONE marks
were likely to cause dilution to the plaintiffs' marks, AUTO ZONE and
ZONE. 126
3.

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight001, Inc.

The plaintiff is the owner of the trademark PAN AM and Globe
logo.1 27 It brought a trademark infringement and dilution action against
the defendant for using the Globe logo.1 28 In a motion for a preliminary
injunction, the district court summarily concluded that the Pan Am
Globe trademark is famous and qualifies for protection under the

TDRA.129
The plaintiff had purchased the PAN AM trademark through bankruptcy proceedings when the original Pan Am Company suffered financial crises and filed for bankruptcy in 1993.130 After the purchase, the
plaintiff had modest airline operations under the trademark, but failed to
succeed financially.131 The plaintiff then filed for bankruptcy and was
acquired subsequently by a holding group in 1998.132 Consequently, the
plaintiff narrowed the scope of its modest operations by offering limited
flights within small geographical regions of the Northeast.133
The defendant operates a chain of retail stores and a website that
features travel-related products.1 34 The defendant did use the PAN AM
trademark and logo in selling its products, but ceased after the plaintiff's attorney contacted the defendant. 135 The defendant, however, continued to use the Flight 001 Globe logo.

125 Id.

126 Id. (noting that "defendants have raised the issue of an inability to prove dilution, plaintiffs
have made no attempt to show actual or likely dilution").
127 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight 001, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 14442(CSH), 2007 WL
2040588, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007).
128 Id.

129 Id. at * 19 (concluding that the plaintiff has "sufficiently established that the Pan Am Globe
logo is famous").
130 Id. at *8.
131 Id. at *9.

132 Id. at *9-10 (finding that the plaintiffs own bankruptcy filing had not caused the
trademarks to be separated from the goodwill because there was not a "drastic alteration" in
services that would cause the plaintiff to forfeit rights in the mark).
133 Id. at *10.
134 Id. at *3.
135 Id. at *3-4.
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In the trademark dilution claim, the court noted that the law had
been recently amended. 136 Under the new law, the TDRA, to "prevail
on a claim of trademark dilution, plaintiff must show that its mark is
'famous."' 137 However, the court failed to analyze whether the Pan Am
Globe logo is famous as required by the TDRA. The court did not issue
any finding on whether the Pan Am Globe logo is widely recognized by
the general consuming public for protection under the TDRA.1 38 The
court instead simply stated that the plaintiff "has sufficiently established
that the Pan Am Globe logo is famous." 1 39 The court, not surprisingly,
cited no evidence supporting its conclusion of fame. The court proceeded on whether the defendant's logo is likely to dilute the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's Pan Am Globe logo by applying the six factors
listed in the statute for likelihood of dilution through blurring. 14 0
C.

QuestionableFindings ofNational Fame

Some courts have relied on the correct legal standard under the
TDRA for evaluating whether a trademark has the necessary fame for
anti-dilution protection. A careful reading of the cases, however, reveals
that although courts applied the factors propounded by the TDRA, they
found the existence of national fame possessed by trademarks that are
actually not known by the general consuming public across the United
States. In other words, they erroneously bestowed national fame on
niche variety trademarks.

136 Id. at *18 n.17 ("The quoted language is from a 2006 amendment to the statute. The
amendment did away with the Supreme Court's holding in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc. ... that 'actual dilution must be established' in order to entitle a plaintiff to an injunction."
(internal citation omitted)).
137 Id. at * 18.
138 Id. at *11 ("It is a famous logo that distinguishes Pan Am's goods and services from those
of others. Furthermore, plaintiffs use of a light blue and white color scheme in combination with
the PAN AM name, PAN AM mark and Pan Am Globe logo is likely to merit trade dress
protection. Plaintiff has sufficiently established that, due to extensive usage and marketing,
consumers associate this color and design scheme with Pan Am.").
139 Id. at *19.
140 Id. (explaining that the six factors include "'whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause
dilution by blurring': (i) the degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark; (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; (iii) the extent to
which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark; (iv)
the degree of recognition of the famous mark; (v) whether the user of the mark or trade name
intended to create an association with the famous mark; and (vi) any actual association between
the mark or trade name and the famous mark" (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006))).
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Dan-Foam A/S v. BrandNamed Beds, LLC

The plaintiff, Dan-Foam A/S, is a Danish corporation that manufactures premium foam-based mattresses, pillows, and cushions under
the trademark TEMPUR-PEDIC.141 The plaintiff brought a dilution by
tarnishment claim, among others, against the defendant for unauthorized
sales of the Tempur-Pedic products.14 2 At summary judgment, the court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the dilution claim. 143
Dan-Foam's products are sold in the United States either through
an authorized dealer network or Dan-Foam's licensees.144 The authorized dealer network includes physicians and other health care professionals, general bedding retailers, and specialty retailers such as Brookstone.14 5 The defendant, Brand Named Beds, LLC, was not an
authorized dealer for the plaintiff.146 The defendant sold viscoelastic
foam bedding products, including Tempur-Pedic mattresses, over the

Internet. 147
The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the
TEMPUR-PEDIC trademark is "widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods ... of the mark's owner."l 48 The court arrived at its conclusion
even though it observed that the plaintiff merely "alleged" that the
goodwill of the TEMPUR-PEDIC trademark had yielded tens of million
of sales.149 The court also stated that the plaintiff claimed that over the
141 Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
142 Id. at 298.

143 Id. at 298 (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts).
144 Id. at 300 (noting that Tempur-Pedic sold through the authorized dealers network come
with warranty).
145 Id. at 301 (finding that the plaintiffs imposed a strict quality control on their products sold
through the authorized dealers network).
146 Though Brand Named Beds, LLC, was not an authorized dealer, it obtained the TempurPedic products through Dan-Foam's authorized retailer. Id. at 302.
147 Brand Named Beds, LLC, had its own online retail store at www.brandnamebeds4less.com
and sold products on eBay. Id.
148 Id. at 323 ("A consideration of the factors suggested by the TDRA could reasonably
support a finding of famousness. The TEMPUR-PEDIC@ trademark has been registered on the
Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office since 1994. Since then, 'the
duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark' has been
considerable. Tempur-Pedic advertises through newspaper and magazine ads, mailings, television
commercials, infomercials, and on the internet. Tempur-Pedic 'actively' and 'continuously'
advertises and promotes its products 'on a national level.' As a result, '[t]he brand is a highly
regarded, distinctive, and widely known identifier of high quality, therapeutic mattresses, pillows,
pads, cushions, slippers and other similar products."').
149 Id. (explaining that the plaintiff alleged that "'the goodwill associated with the TEMPURPEDIC@ trademark has translated into tens of millions of dollars in sales over the years,' and that
'[i]n the past three years alone, sales of goods bearing the TEMPUR-PEDIC@ trademark have
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last three years, it spent in total an aggregate excess of $250 million in
connection with the advertisement and promotion of its products. 5 0
Additionally, the plaintiff asserted that it had sold approximately 15,000
Tempur-Pedic mattresses for use at Veterans Administration facilities,
general hospitals, rehabilitation and long-term care facilities, sleep centers, and labs.151 The plaintiff received recognition from Good Housekeeping and awards from Consumers Digest and the Arthritis Founda-

tion for its beds.152
Peculiarly, the court reached its conclusion that the TEMPURPEDIC trademark is famous after it noted that the plaintiff had not offered any evidence regarding the "amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods" offered under the TEMPUR-PEDIC trademark.153 The plaintiff presented no consumer survey to establish "actual
recognition" of the TEMPUR-PEDIC trademark.' 5 4 The court then proceeded to the dilution prong and dismissed the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the dilution claim. 155
2.

University ofKansas v. Sinks

The University of Kansas and Kansas Athletics, Inc., a not-forprofit entity of the university created for the operation of intercollegiate
athletic programs, brought an action against the defendants for manufacturing and selling trademarked products in violation of trademark
dilution and infringement law.156 Specifically, the defendants used
without authorization the plaintiffs trademarks KU with the crimson
and blue scheme and the Jayhawk mascot.' 5 7
On the dilution claim, the jury found that the KU trademark is famous, and the defendants' use of the trademark was likely to cause dilution of the plaintiffs famous trademark and logo.' 58 The defendants
moved for judgment as a matter of law to set aside the jury's verdict,
since there was lack of evidence at trial to establish that the plaintiffs

exceeded $2 billion"').
150 Id. at 323 n.209 (citing to the plaintiffs complaint).
151 Id. at 323.

152 Id. ("Good Housekeeping magazine has 'recognized' Tempur-Pedic's mattresses, and
Tempur-Pedic has 'received awards from Consumers Digest and the Arthritis Foundation."').
153 Id. ("The parties have not presented much evidence regarding '[t]he amount, volume, and
geographic extent of sales of goods .. . offered' under the TEMPUR-PEDIC@ mark.").
154 Id. at 323-24.
155 Id. at 324-27.

156 Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2008).
157 Id. at 1305-06.

158 Id. at 1293-94, 1304 (the jury returned the verdict on all counts against the defendants).
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trademarks "enjoy widespread fame."1 59 The court denied the defendants' post-trial motion and affirmed the jury's finding.160
The court found that there was "sufficient evidence of national
fame" to satisfy the TDRA.16 1 For example, the court relied on the evidence of the use of the KU marks in non-sporting events, unsolicited
media coverage of athletic teams, plus the use of trademarks by the
plaintiff for over 100 years.162 The court concluded that the combination
of evidence, including "advertising, unsolicited media references, brochures about the University, and substantial sales of KU's licensed merchandise displaying the marks" supports the jury's finding of "national
fame" for the KU marks.163
The defendants argued that the KU trademark is known only in the
collegiate sports niche. Specifically, the defendant compared the KU
trademark to the UT (University of Texas) and longhorn logo marks,
and asserted that the KU marks do not enjoy national widespread fame
as required under the TDRA. 164 The defendant buttressed its argument
with a published decision on the UT and longhorn logo marks. Despite
the fact that the UT and longhorn logo marks are known through regularly televised football games, extensive licensing programs, and appearances of the marks on Wheaties boxes, the district court in Texas
held that the UT and longhorn logo marks do not possess the widespread fame required under the TDRA.165 Therefore, the defendant argued, the jury verdict on widespread national fame possessed by the KU
marks should be overturned. The court in the KU trademark case, however, rejected the defendant's argument and conclusively found that,
unlike the UT trademark, KU is not a niche-famous mark.166
159 Id. at 1306 ("[D]efendants argue that there was no evidence at trial that plaintiffs' marks
enjoy widespread fame sufficient to support a finding of liability on the dilution claims.").
160 Id. at 1304 (denying defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law and to alter or
amend).
161 Id. at 1307.

162 Id. ("[Plaintiffs] submitted an abundance of evidence on the use of the various marks both
within and outside the context of sporting events. In addition to national media coverage and
exposure of the athletic teams, plaintiff submitted evidence that KU has been referred to as
'Kansas' since the 1930s and that KU has used the crimson and blue color scheme and the
Jayhawk mascot for over 100 years.").
163 Id.

164 Id. at 1306-07 (noting that the defendants relied on the analysis performed in Bd of
Regents, the University of Texas System v. KST Electric, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 679 (W.D.

Tex. 2008), which addressed the "longhorn silhouette logo" and the court in that case "rejected
the plaintiffs circumstantial evidence of fame because it all related to the use of the logo at or
concerning sporting events").
165 Id.

166 Id. at 1307 (relying on testimony provided by KU to support the existence of a famous
trademark). Specifically, the court noted that,
When viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, this evidence, along with
evidence of advertising, unsolicited media references, brochures about the University,
and substantial sales of KU's licensed merchandise displaying the marks, supports the
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New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc.

The plaintiff, New York City Triathlon, LLC, owner of the trademark NEW YORK CITY TRIATHLON, brought a trademark dilution
claim, among others, against the seller of triathlon equipment for using
NYC TRIATHLON CLUB, NYC TRI CLUB, and NEW YORK CITY
TRIATHLON CLUB. 167 The court granted the plaintiffs motion for a
preliminary injunction upon finding the trademark NEW YORK CITY
TRIATHLON famous and that the defendant's use of the mark will
likely cause dilution in violation of the TDRA.168
The court, similar to other courts, provided the obligatory citations
and quotations from the TDRA that a famous mark must be "widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States,"1 69
and that there are four nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in
determining fame. 170 The court found the trademark NEW YORK
CITY TRIATHLON famous under the TDRA, even though the plaintiff
had only used it for about ten years,' 71 the plaintiff owned no federal
registration for the trademark,172 its annual summer event attracted only
about 20,000 potential triathlon athletes who vied for the 5600 entry
spots,173 and the event raised about two million dollars each year for
national charities. 174 Despite these shortcomings, the court found that
the trademark NEW YORK CITY TRIATHLON is "widely recog-

jury's finding of national fame. Likewise, defendants' evidence of third-party use of
the marks does not require judgment in their favor as a matter of law. While the jury
could certainly consider this evidence in making a determination of fame on the
dilution claims, it was not required to weigh it more heavily than plaintiffs' evidence of
fame. Under the standard this Court must apply on a motion for judgment as a matter
of law, there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could have found fame
despite the evidence of third-party use.
Id.

167 N.Y.C. Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
168 Id. at 327 ("Plaintiffs [sic] motion for an order preliminarily enjoining Defendant's
ongoing trademark and trade name infringement, dilution, cybersquatting, unfair competition, and
deceptive trade practices is granted.").
169 Id. at 321.

170 Id. (quoting

15 U.S.C.

§ 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv)).

§ 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) and the four factors from id.

171 Id. (stating that the New York City Triathlon is an Olympic-distance triathlon, consisting of
a 1500 meter swim in the Hudson River, a forty kilometer bike ride up the West Side Highway,
and a ten kilometer run into Central Park which has been run every summer in New York City
since 2001).
172 Id. (noting that the registrations for the plaintiff's trademarks are still pending).
173 Id. at 322 (observing that the plaintiffs annual summer triathlon event "sells out in
minutes, with 20,000 people around the world this year vying for the 5,600 entry spots").
174 Id. ("Approximately $2 million is raised each year for national charities, such as the
American Cancer Society and the Leukemia & Lymphoma Society.").
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nized" because national media outlets covered the plaintiffs event and
companies such as Ford, Nautica, Gatorade, Visa, Dasani, JetBlue,
among others, sponsored its event. 175
4.

Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. America's Team
Properties,Inc.

The plaintiff, the Dallas Cowboys Football Club, the owner of an
unregistered trademark AMERICA'S TEAM, brought a trademark action against the defendant. 176 With respect to the trademark dilution
claim, the court found that AMERICA'S TEAM qualified as a famous
trademark for protection under the TDRA.17 7
The defendant obtained a federal registration for the trademark
AMERICA'S TEAM in 1998, but first used it in commerce in 1990.178
The defendant used the trademark on t-shirts, which it sold at sporting
events. 179 On the other hand, the plaintiff began using America's Team
as the title of their football team's 1978 season highlight film.180 The
plaintiff then used the term for a calendar in 1979-1980, sold a videocassette titled America's Team: The Dallas Cowboys 1975-1979, and

granted a license to an entity for silver coins using the engraved term.' 8'
The plaintiff also used the term on various souvenir products. In 1992,
the plaintiff obtained a Texas trademark registration for DALLAS
COWBOYS AMERICA'S TEAM for use on clothing. 182 The plaintiff
made "millions" selling items with the term at various locations in Texas and on the Internet.183
Similar to other courts that had bestowed national fame status on
marks with limited recognition, the court in this case cited to the TDRA,
and acknowledged that federal law imposes a "higher standard" for
fame and requires that a mark is famous "if it is widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States." 84 The court also
175 Id. ("It is clear that Plaintiffs marks are widely recognized.").
176 Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Am.'s Team Props., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 622 (N.D.
Tex. 2009).
177 Id. at 643.
178 Id. at 629-30.

179 Id. at 630. In 2003, the defendant approached the plaintiff for the purchase and sale of the
federal trademark registration. The plaintiff refused and brought the lawsuit against the defendant.
180
181
182
183

Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id.

184 Id. at 643 ("Federal law requires a higher standard, requiring a mark to be 'famous' as well
as distinctive. '[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of
the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner.'
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(c)(1) (2006) and quoting id. § 1 125(c)(2)(A))).
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reiterated the relevant factors for finding fame under the TDRA, such as
"the duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity
of the mark; the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of
goods or services offered under the mark; the extent of actual recognition of the mark; and whether the mark was registered."18 5 After the
obligatory citation and quotation taken from the TDRA, the court summarily found that the plaintiff had "established the long duration and
geographic reach" of the AMERICA'S TEAM trademark.186 Furthermore, with respect to the plaintiffs survey for "actual recognition" of
the trademark, the court found that the plaintiffs survey "demonstrates
actual recognition among a relevant consumer base."' 87 The court failed
to realize that the law requires wide recognition by the general consuming public, not the relevant consumer base of the plaintiff. The court
concluded that AMERICA'S TEAM is famous, and proceeded with a
positive finding of dilution by blurring and tamishment against the defendant.188
In summary, the cases above demonstrate that courts across the
United States, five years after the TDRA became effective, are still having difficulty with the fame analysis. Some courts applied outright the
legal standard that is no longer the law. Other courts cited the new statute, quoted the correct standard and factors, and yet engaged in a cursory analysis that rendered questionable findings of fame. Some courts
ignored fame completely and advanced to the next inquiry under the
TDRA by analyzing dilution by blurring or tarnishment to reach their
intended results. These decisions are not acceptable; they are contrary to
the requirement of a heightened level of fame under the TDRA. It is
time to identify what has caused the courts to render such erroneous or
questionable decisions, and to suggest changes for a more uniform result consistent with the intent of the TDRA.
IV.

DEFINING FAME AS NATIONAL FAME

The erroneous decisions rendered by district courts across the
United States have several possible explanations. With respect to the
cases wherein courts applied the wrong legal standard, courts will soon
realize that the TDRA is the current law. This type of problem is not a
major surprise, as the decisions were entered when the TDRA was still

185

Id.

186 Id.

187 Id. (emphasis added).
188 Id. (finding dilution under both federal and state statutes).
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new on the books. It will disappear on its own as more recent cases consistently apply current law.' 89
For the cases where courts ignored fame and proceeded to the dilution prong, there is a possible explanation. Fame is the threshold issue
in a trademark dilution claim, and that means courts have no authority
to ignore it. 190 A possible explanation for judicial decisions that ignore
the fame analysis is that the defendants in these cases either conceded
too soon that the plaintiffs trademark is famous or failed to challenge
that the plaintiffs trademark does not possess the high level of fame
required by the TDRA, which states that the mark must be widely recognized by the consuming public of the United States. To rectify this
situation demands an understanding of what "widely recognized by the
general consuming public" really means. A solution to this problem will
be discussed later below.
With regard to the cases where courts knew that the TDRA is the
law, cited to the statute, extracted language from the TDRA for the high
standard of fame, and reiterated the relevant factors listed in the TDRA
for fame analysis, the problem is more acute. It seems that sentimentality and provincialism dictated the outcome. For example, the district
court in Kansas held that the trademark KU and its mascot were famous
under the TDRA, even though the marks were known only in the collegiate sports arena. 191 Likewise, the District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that the Dallas Cowboys' AMERICA'S TEAM
trademark is famous under the stringent fame standard.192 The District
Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the plaintiff who organized the annual summer triathlon event under the term
NEW YORK CITY TRIATHLON by finding the term famous according to the TDRA.193 Additionally, in these types of cases, the defendants did not always rigorously challenge the fame finding. These decisions made a mockery of the intention of the statute.
Courts are mandated to follow the language of the TDRA, as
passed by Congress and effective since 2006. Courts must recognize
that protection provided under the TDRA is reserved for only a very
few worthy trademarks in the United States. Indeed, Congress only
189 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon Club, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 2d 305, 321
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing the TDRA); Dall. Cowboys Football Club, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (citing
the TDRA); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1306 (D. Kan. 2008) (citing the
TDRA).
190 See Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 697-98
(W.D. Ky. 2010) ("Whether a mark is 'famous' is the threshold issue in a trademark dilution
claim. 'Fame' is a lexicon of art particular to trademark jurisprudence; it is not at all the same as
asking 'the man on the street' whether a name, mark or product is 'famous.' It is not proven
through the words of trade publication articles declaring it so.").
191 Univ. ofKan., 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287.
192 Dall. Cowboys Football Club, 616 F. Supp. 2d 622.
193 N. YC Triathlon, 704 F. Supp. 2d 305.
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wanted anti-dilution protection for a very few deserving trademarks.1 94
The rationale rested on the recognition that whereas an ordinary trademark's infringement action requires proof of likelihood of consumer
confusion,195 a famous trademark qualified for anti-dilution protection
has the power to block uses of a similar or identical mark on goods or
services that are not actually competing,196 and there is, therefore, an
absence of likelihood of consumer confusion originating from the use of
the junior trademark in the marketplace.1 97 In other words, famous
trademarks are viewed as property, just like patents and copyrights, and
the holders of such marks enjoy the property-like protection to preserve
194 Anti-dilution protection for famous marks means "a limited group of marks that are
genuinely famous." TDRA Hearings, supra note 75, at 10; see also H.R. REP. No. 109-23, at 8
(2005) ("In addition, the [TDRA] expands the threshold of 'fame' and thereby denies protection
for marks that are famous only in 'niche' markets."); Duvall, supra note 28, at 1262 ("The
TDRA's revised fame standard will help keep dilution law in check and should resolve the
concerns of most critics that the FTDA was too often applied in cases where it was not
justified.").
195 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006):
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely
to be damaged by such act.
196 Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that
dilution of a famous trademark through blurring "involves a diminution in the uniqueness or
individuality of a mark because of its use on unrelated goods"). The idea of broad protection for
famous trademarks has long been advocated by the courts. See Commc'ns Satellite Corp. v.
Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1248 (4th Cir. 1970) ("COMSAT has become recognized
throughout the United States as identifying and distinguishing plaintiff and its communications
services. These facts . . . establish it as a strong mark and a famous name.... [I]t is entitled to
broad protection."); Hanson v. Triangle Publ'ns, 163 F.2d 74, 76 (8th Cir. 1947) (affirming the
district court's finding that the defendant's use of the trademark SEVENTEEN on dresses was for
the purpose of trading on taking "unfair advantage of the [Seventeen] magazine's fame, reputation
and good will"); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, 364 F. Supp. 775, 783 (D.S.C. 1973) ("The
plaintiffs marks are famous throughout the United States and are becoming well known in many
other countries... . These property rights of the plaintiff are entitled to broad protection."); Stix
Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 479, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("By 1958
United's products under its trade-mark CON-TACT had gained commercial acceptance, and the
name was recognized by the industry and the purchasing public as a Famous Brand.").
197 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (2006) ("[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive,
inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another
person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or
trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of
the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury.").
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their investment in the marks under the anti-dilution law. 198 That means
only trademarks that are "widely recognized by the general consuming
public of the United States" are accorded property-like power.199
Trademarks with this fame status are and should be very scarce. Courts
must follow the statute and function as gatekeeper of the fame portal, so
only very few trademarks can pass through for the heightened protection propounded under the trademark jurisprudence.
To adhere to the language and the intent of the statute, courts must
interpret the phrase "widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States" to mean that the mark must have national
fame. 200 A mark with national prominence such as the University of
Texas (UT) trademark and its longhorn silhouette logo are not marks
with national fame, as prominent marks are known only within a particular niche, such as collegiate sports, although the niche is nation-

198 See Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 628 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that
dilution law, unlike trademark infringement, is not based on a likelihood of confusion standard,
"but only exists to protect the quasi-property rights a holder has in maintaining the integrity and
distinctiveness of his mark"); see also Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the
Boundaries of the Firm, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 345, 353 (2009) ("Treatment of trademarks as
independent property is also apparent in claims for dilution. Dilution recognizes that the value of
certain famous marks will be diminished if they are used too often in the marketplace;
unauthorized but nonconfusing uses can be restricted by the mark owner in order to preserve the
mark's distinctiveness."); Jonathan Moskin, Victoria's Big Secret: Whither Dilution Under the
Federal Dilution Act?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 842, 843-44 (2004) ("[T]wentieth century

trademark law ... witnessed the expansion of trademark rights from a tort-based theory
preventing direct diversion of sales between competitors to a broader set of rights resting on a
recognition that trademarks themselves possess economic value . . . ."); Simone Rose, Will Atlas
Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous" Trademarks: Anti-Competitive "Monopoly" or
"Earned" Trademark Right?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 653, 740 (1995) ("[V]iewing dilution relief as

protecting an earned property interest should help engender a positive presumption that dilution
protection effectively protects the source identification, persona and quality assurance property of
famous and 'highly distinctive' trademarks. Dilution statutes would finally mirror traditional
trademark, patent and copyright statutes by providing the most effective balance between
rewarding the creator of famous marks while simultaneously promoting free market competition
and the free dissemination of ideas. Atlas will no longer shrug, but welcome the addition of these
earned property rights."); Wilf, supra note 47 ("Dilution doctrine represented a shift from a tort
model to a proprietary model of trademark. Trademarks had been transformed into a distinct form
of property with uncanny psychological power.").
199 Commentators have also observed that the protection for famous trademarks under TDRA
is so broad that "it provides strong incentives for wealthy companies to strive to make each mark
'widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States."' Alexandra J. Roberts,
New-School Trademark Dilution: Famous Among the Juvenile Consuming Public,49 IDEA 579,

645 (2009).
200 Oriental Fin. Grp. v. Cooperativa De Ahorro y Cr6dito Oriental, No. 10-1444 (JAF), 2010
WL 4117236 (D.P.R. Oct. 20, 2010) (finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the trademark
ORIENTAL has achieved "national fame" as required under federal dilution law); Nat'l Bus.
Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. H-08-1906, 2009 WL 3570387, at *7 n.18 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 30, 2009) ("If Ford intends to pursue dilution claims regarding these products at trial, it
must proffer evidence showing that each mark it alleges was diluted has achieved the requisite
degree of 'national fame' necessary to support a trademark dilution claim.").
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wide. 20 1 Marks with national prominence like UT and KU are not necessarily marks that have become household names throughout the
United States. 202
That means the courts should impose upon the plaintiff the burden
of submitting a consumer survey evidencing the overall, general consuming public recognition of the trademark throughout the United
States. 203 Obviously, the survey must be conducted according to accepted principles. 204 A well-designed, properly-conducted survey is
reliable direct evidence of whether the mark is indeed recognized by the
public.205
Complying with the TDRA, the survey samples cannot concentrate
on the consuming public within a particular population, industry, or
market.206 Also, the survey samples must be taken from many locations
across the United States to reflect the overall general consuming public
recognition of the trademark at issue. 207 The recognition level must be
at least seventy percent of the overall general consuming public of the
United States, identifying the trademark as a source identifier of only
the plaintiff s goods or services. 208
201 See Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. KST Elec., Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 678 (W.D.
Tex. 2008) ("Simply because UT athletics have achieved a level of national prominence does not
necessarily mean that the longhorn logo is so ubiquitous and well-known to stand toe-to-toe with
Buick or KODAK.").
202 See Thane Int'l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
dilution protection extends only to those whose mark is a "household name").
203 Under the old dilution statute, courts criticized plaintiffs for not conducting consumer
survey evidence to prove fame. See, e.g.,TCPIP Holding Co., v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d
88, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that the plaintiffs evidence of sales and advertising
expenditures failed to establish fame and noting that the plaintiffs had offered no consumer
recognition survey to support its alleged fame).
204 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir.
1982) (finding that the district court erred in excluding trademark survey evidence that showed
the percentage of the public identified Prudential's Gibraltar logo as a source of its insurance
services).
205 See Alan S. Cooper, How the Courts are Applying the Federal Trademark Dilution Act as
Amended by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, SN053 ALI-ABA 247, 255 (2009)

(suggesting that "[d]irect evidence in the form of a properly designed and conducted survey that
establishes such national public recognition would seem to carry far greater weight than
circumstantial evidence").
206 Hal Poret, Hot Topics in Trademark Surveys, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK

LAw 2009, at 133, 143 (PLI Patents, Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course
Handbook Ser. No. 19111, 2009) (asserting that "researchers attempting to measure dilution
should think carefully before: (1) using a universe that is defined so as to be limited to a
specialized class of consumers; and (2) limiting the universe to a particular geography. Such
definitions of the universe may be criticized and possibly lead to the exclusion of the survey").
207 Id.

208 See Gen. Motors Co. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC., No. 2:06-CV-00133 BSJ, 2010 WL
5395065, at *5 (D. Utah Dec. 27, 2010) (noting that "over 71% of participants were able to
produce the names GM or Hummer when shown an image of a boxy, military-style vehicle" and
finding that the survey evidence together with extensive advertising efforts in the amount of
hundreds of millions of dollars and large amount of revenue generated of over $2 billion support
a finding of Hummer as a famous trademark); 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1715, at
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This bright-line requirement of a high percentage of recognition of
a mark through survey evidence is consistent with the intent of the statute that only a very few marks deserve such broad, property-like, antidilution protection. 209 It is also consistent with trademark jurisprudence
that in the likelihood of confusion or trademark infringement actions, it
is not necessary to submit consumer recognition survey evidence in
order to receive a low level of protection compared to broad antidilution protection. 210
The survey cannot be a typical brand awareness study. For example, consider a measure of brand awareness among whiskey drinkers for
brands like Bacardi, Jack Daniels, Jim Beam, Cuervo, Absolute, and
others. The result from a brand awareness study is merely a marketing
survey or a study of the awareness of brands within a niche. 211 In other
words, this type of brand awareness study is for a company to strategize
its marketing plan; it is not a substitute for the actual recognition of the
trademark from the overall general consuming public across the United
States as a source identifier of the plaintiffs goods or services. 212 Es-

*14 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (finding that the survey evidence showing seventy-three percent unaided
recognition of BIG GULP was sufficient to meet the high level of fame required under TDRA).
But see Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1014 (9th Cir. 2004) (ruling
that survey evidence of sixty-five percent of the attitude of people who intended to purchase a
new car recognized the NISSAN trademark coupled with promotional expenditures of $898
million during the period 1985-91 were not conclusive to support "as a matter of law" at
summary judgment that the NISSAN trademark was famous as of 1991).
209 Under the old trademark dilution statutes, some commentators have advocated for a lower
percentage. McCarthy, for example, recommends that a plaintiffs mark must be known by more
than fifty percent of the defendant's potential customers in order to be considered "famous." 4 J.

THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:92, at 24164 (4th ed. 1999); see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving
Fame and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark DilutionAct, 63 ALB. L. REv. 201, 234 (1999)

(advocating a forty percent rate of recognition among defendant's potential customers in a
nationwide survey).
210 See Hainline v. Vanity Fair, Inc., 301 F. App'x 949, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Direct evidence
of fame, for example from widespread consumer polls, rarely appears in contests over likelihood

ofconfusion. Instead, our cases teach that the fame of a mark may be measured indirectly, among
other things, by the volume of sales and advertising expenditures of the goods traveling under the
mark, and by the length of time those indicia of commercial awareness have been evident."
(emphasis added) (quoting Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2002))).
211 Maker's Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 699 (W.D. Ky.
2010) (finding that the plaintiffs trademark is not widely known among the general consuming
public because the name is recognized by sixty-nine percent among whisky drinkers).
212 Courts have long distinguished the differences between a brand awareness study from a
trademark recognition survey. See Loctite Corp. v. Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp.
190, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (distinguishing a brand awareness study from a trademark recognition
survey by noting that marketing surveys conducted before litigation were designed to test for
brand awareness, whereas the "single issue at hand ... [was] whether consumers understood the
term 'Super Glue' to designate glue from a single source").
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sentially, the fame survey is for dilution litigation purposes, 213 not for a
marketing campaign. 214
Evidence of volume of sales, advertising expenditures, and geographical reach continues to be required for fame analysis. The indirect
evidence, however, should not be a substitute for consumer survey evidence proving at least seventy percent of the general consuming public
recognition of the mark. Indirect evidence alone has been rejected by
courts, even under the old statute, as insufficient to establish fame recognition. 215
CONCLUSION

The desire to protect fame acquired and possessed by a trademark
through years of investments in advertisements, expansive uses, and
enforcement is consistent with the public fascination with fame. Trademark jurisprudence strongly favors the protection of the consumer, not
trademark owners. Bestowing property-like protection to trademarks
requires concrete proof of national fame through a proper consumer
survey evidencing at least seventy percent of the general consuming
213 Some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit, are known for not according weight to surveys
conducted not for the litigation at issue. See Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Survey Evidence:
Review of Current Trends in the Ninth Circuit, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

715, 721 (2005) (noting that the Ninth Circuit routinely does not accord weight to surveys
conducted for non-litigation purposes or for another case).
214 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, 869 PLI/Pat 329, 341

(2006) ("Surveys not conducted specifically in preparation for, or in response to, litigation may
provide important information, but they frequently ask irrelevant questions or select inappropriate
samples of respondents for study.").
215 TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2001). The
court stated in TCPIP Holding that:
We do not believe TCPIP's submissions to the district court demonstrated the degree
of fame necessary to qualify. The submissions were quite sketchy. According to
TCPIP's affidavit, in 1999 it operated 228 retail stores in 27 states under the mark "The
Children's Place," and achieved sales in 1998 of $280 million, having grown from
$100 million in sales though 87 stores in 1994. Over the past decade, the affidavit
asserts, TCPIP spent "tens of millions of dollars" advertising its mark, but does not tell
how many millions, when expended, or how effectively. Nor did TCPIP submit
consumer surveys, press accounts, or other evidence of fame. The affidavit gives no
statistics of any kind pertaining to any year earlier than 1994. While it asserts that the
plaintiff (and its predecessors) have used the mark continuously and exclusively for
thirty years, it gives no further information-apart from unsubstantiated conclusory
phrases like "the mark The Children's Place has been widely recognized by American
consumers"-that would enable a court to determine the extent or dimension of public
recognition of the mark and whether it has fame sufficient to meet the requirement of
the Act. While the information given undoubtedly shows considerable commercial
success and growth, the aggregate sales under the mark since it originated (which have
not been furnished to us) may well not equal the sales of Dupont, Buick, or Kodak in
any given month.
Id.
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public across the United States recognizes the trademark. The heightened requirement of national fame strikes a reasonable balance between
the interests of trademark owners and the public.

